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C00002 00002	I would like to raise some issues about the extreme conservation measures
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I would like to raise some issues about the extreme conservation measures
that would be required by a sudden, severe and prolonged supply
interruption in liquid fuels.  My reference crisis involves the sudden
reduction of liquid fuel use in the U.S. to one quarter its present value
and lasts until a crash program of production of synthetic fuels,
increased recovery and substitution by nuclear and coal-generated
electricity restores equilibrium between demand and the new cost of
production.  The reason for supposing liquid fuels to be reduced to one
quarter is that we now import half our liquid fuels, and I assume this
production lost.  I further suppose that during the crisis we export to
our worse off allies half of the liquid fuels we produce including half of
the new production of synthetics as it comes on line.  I suppose we export
half, because that does our allies half the maximum good we could do; we
could not do qualitatively better.

Such a crisis would disrupt our economy and many workers could not
continue their jobs.  On the other hand, vast manpower, e.g., automobile
workers and college students, would be available to build synthetic fuel
production facilities, to convert plants to coal and finish the nuclear
backlog.  The crisis would probably be as disruptive as World War II to
our economy and last as long, i.e., four years.

Ending the crisis in four years by a "production miracle" requires that,
our mobilization for production be as prompt and smooth as our World War
II mobilization.  This requires that our political energies go mainly into
enacting adequate measures for the mobilization and not into fighting each
other.

This will be difficult but not impossible.  In 1973, each political
tendency in society continued to say what it had been saying all along -
only louder.  Here are some considerations relating to the emergency
conservation program.

1. The initial crisis will hit different parts of the country differently.
Most oil-heated houses may have to be temporarily closed up, children and
other non-workers evacuated to the South and houses near work places
temporarily converted to rooming houses.

2.  Some ways of implementing the required combination of rationing and
pricing would exacerbate internal conflicts, and others would mobilize
effort to restore normality.  The plan should be based on whatever
understanding we can acquire about which is which.

3.  Acceptance of hardship requires that restoration of normality be the
perceived goal.

4.  The level of hardship might be more or less than that endured by
American civilians in World War II.  It would not approach that endured by
British, Japanese, German civilians and would be nowhere near that endured
in Russia or occupied Europe.

5.  It would be good if we could prepare a contingency plan that Congress
could vote on now.  However, this seems unlikely for two reasons; First,
we don't know what the crisis will be like.  On the one hand it may be
less severe or prolonged and on the other hand, it may involve additional
complications like war.  Second, Congress could not pay the political
costs, including the breaking of longstanding coalitions and forming new
ones, in order to decide hypothetical questions.  In particular it would
require moderates on both sides of present economic and environmental
issues to break with the extremists who provide their best troops in order
to reach a compromise.  The political blood spilled to solve a presently
hypothetical issue would be real blood not hypothetical.  6.
Nevertheless, some political prepaaration may be possible.  Perhaps we
could agree on a plan with two undecided parameters.  One parameter would
be on the liberal--conservative political dimension, e.g., the amount of a
tax on profits or the magnitude of an income equalization measure.  The
second parameter would be on the environment vs. growth axis, e.g., the
amount of compromise with environmental standards.  Agrement on the
parametrized plan might be obtained now, because, for example, a
conservative would be pleased with the plan if only the
liberal-conservative panel came out "right" enough, and the liberal would
like the plan if it came out sufficiently to the "left."


When the crisis came, Congress would fight it out according to the
strength at the time of the contending views and set the values of the
parameters.  The alliances would be broken and reformed and the political
blood shed, but less time would be required than if every detail had to be
fought out along liberal- conservative and environment-growth dimensions.


This idea may be hopelessly naive in its present form, but perhaps some
elements of it will be found usable.

John McCarthy

MAIN POINTS
           
     l.  Which measures generate internal cooperation and which conflict.

     2.  A plan with open political or ideological parameters.